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In 2013, Target reported that the credit card and personally identifiable
information of “as many as 110 million customers” had been compromised.1
In 2014, Yahoo! announced that a “state-sponsored actor” had gained access
to personal information of 500 million users that year, and “all 3 billion user
accounts had been compromised” in a data breach that occurred in 2013.2
Nine months into 2014, nearly 2000 cybersecurity incidents were confirmed,
“compromis[ing] almost [one] [b]illion records worldwide.”3  In 2017,
Equifax reported a data breach that exposed nearly 150 million consumers.4
Between January 2017 and August 2018, “[a]t least 16 separate security
breaches occurred at retailers,” including Macy’s, Sears, Delta Air Lines, Best
Buy, Panera, and Whole Foods.5  Even after its Cambridge Analytica scandal,
Facebook reported in 2018 that “at least 50 million users’ data were con-
firmed at risk after attackers exploited a vulnerability that allowed them
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020.  Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science and Sociology, Northwestern University, 2013.  I would like to thank
Professor Veronica Root Martinez for her guidance, feedback, and mentorship, and my
colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review for their revisions and suggestions.  All errors are
my own.
1 Taylor Armerding, The 18 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO (Dec. 20,
2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-
breaches-of-the-21st-century.html.
2 Id.; Jonathan Stempel & Jim Finkle, Yahoo Says All Three Billion Accounts Hacked in
2013 Data Theft, REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-cyber/
yahoo-says-all-three-billion-accounts-hacked-in-2013-data-theft-idUSKCN1C82O1.
3 Francis J. Burke, Jr. & Steven M. Millendorf, Cybersecurity and Privacy Enforce-
ment: A Roundup of 2014 Cases 10 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2015/2015-corporate-cle/8b_2_cybersecurity_
and_privacy_enforcement.pdf.
4 Steve Ragan, Equifax Says Website Vulnerability Exposed 143 Million US Consumers, CSO
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3223229/security/equifax-says-web
site-vulnerability-exposed-143-million-us-consumers.html.
5 Dennis Green & Mary Hanbury, If You Shopped at These 16 Stores in the Last Year, Your
Data Might Have Been Stolen, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.businessin
sider.com/data-breaches-2018-4.
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access to personal data.”6  Worse yet, it was found that “[t]he vulnerability
was introduced on the site in July 2017, but Facebook didn’t know about it
until” mid-September 2018.7
One need not be a cybersecurity expert to recognize that cyber risk is
escalating: companies that many of us regularly use, trust, and rely on are
falling to data hacks left and right.  The number of “[r]ecent highly publi-
cized data breaches have underscored the growing reality that attacks on pri-
vate corporations constitute a national security issue.”8  According to industry
experts: “today it is a matter of when, not if, a company’s data will be
breached.”9  The Ponemon Institute reported in 2018 that “[t]he risk of
cyber extortion and data breaches will increase in frequency,” but that
“[d]espite the growing cyber threat, cybersecurity is not considered a strate-
gic priority.”10  In 2018, the average expenditures required to address a data
breach continued to increase, with the average total expenditure increasing
to $3.86 million and the average cost for each lost or stolen record increasing
to $148.11  Living “in a world where every action we take can be observed,
recorded, analyzed, and stored[,] . . . consumers want better consumer pro-
tections over personal data.”12
In Part I, this Note discusses the concerning regularity of high-profile
data breaches that have occurred within the United States’ weak and patch-
work landscape of cybersecurity law.  Part II discusses the challenges compa-
nies face when attempting to comply with the current cybersecurity law, and
why companies who are deemed compliant are still falling victim to hackers
and data breaches.  Part III makes a call for federal legislation to replace the
current, inadequate, fragmented, and uneven landscape of cybersecurity law.
Part IV discusses numerous factors and incentives to consider in creating an
omnibus federal cybersecurity law.  Finally, Part V offers some critiques to
creating an omnibus law.
6 Sarah Perez & Zack Whittaker, Everything You Need to Know About Facebook’s Data
Breach Affecting 50M Users, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 28, 2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/
09/28 /everything-you-need-to-know-about-facebooks-data-breach-affecting-50m-users/.
7 Id.
8 Thad A. Davis et al., The Data Security Governance Conundrum: Practical Solutions and
Best Practices for the Boardroom and the C-Suite, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 613, 624.
9 David C. Grossman, Blaming the Victim: How FTC Data Security Enforcement Actions
Make Companies and Consumers More Vulnerable to Hackers, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1283, 1284
(2016); see also Scot Ganow & Zachary Heck, Proactive Approach to Cybersecurity Pays Off in
Ohio with New Data Protection Act, TAFT: PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY INSIGHT (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.privacyanddatasecurityinsight.com/2018/08/proactive-approach-to-cyber-
security-pays-off-in-ohio-with-new-data-protection-act/.
10 PONEMON INST., 2018 STUDY ON GLOBAL MEGATRENDS IN CYBERSECURITY 1–2 (2018),
https://www.raytheon.com/sites/default/files/2018-02/2018_Global_Cyber_Mega
trends.pdf.
11 PONEMON INST., 2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL OVERVIEW 3 (2018),
https://databreachcalculator.mybluemix.net/assets/2018_Global_Cost_of_a_Data_Breach
_Report.pdf [hereinafter COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY].
12 Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 355, 355 (2015).
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I. CURRENT STATE OF CYBERSECURITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES:
A FRAGMENTED FRAMEWORK OF CYBERSECURITY OBLIGATIONS
Despite the increasing frequency of data privacy breaches compared to
the rest of the world, “the legal framework to protect privacy and personal
data in the United States is quite weak.”13  Part of this weakness is due to the
fragmented, patchwork nature of cybersecurity laws, which in turn makes it
difficult for companies to comply.  As it stands, “[t]he United States does not
have a national law that prescribes specific data security standards for all
industries.”14  Instead, companies must figure out how to comply with a “frag-
mented and disconnected framework of state and federal laws governing
cybersecurity obligations.”15  The United States’ framework consists of “hun-
dreds of state and federal statutes, regulations, binding guidelines, and court-
created rules regarding data security, privacy, and other issues commonly
considered to fall under the umbrella ‘cybersecurity.’”16  Once a breach
occurs, “[c]ompanies . . . might face potential enforcement and private civil
actions brought by” the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), state attorneys general, the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ), plaintiffs whose data was compromised, shareholders of the com-
pany, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Department of Health and Human
Services, to name a few.17  Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal spurred
“investigations by four federal agencies”—the FBI, the FTC, the SEC, and the
DOJ.18
A. Federal Sectoral Approach
While many other industrialized nations “protect all personal data in an
omnibus fashion, privacy law in the United States is sectoral, with different
laws regulating different industries and economic sectors.”19  The only fed-
eral data security laws that exist in the United States are industry specific,
only “apply[ing] to companies that handle specific types of data, such as
financial information or health records.”20  For example, “[t]here is a law for
13 Id. at 356.
14 JEFF KOSSEFF, CYBERSECURITY LAW 1 (2017).
15 Jennifer Gordon, Note, Like A Bad Neighbor, Hackers Are There: The Need for Data Secur-
ity Legislation and Cyber Insurance in Light of Increasing FTC Enforcement Actions, 11 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 183, 185 (2016).
16 KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at xxi.
17 JUDITH H. GERMANO & ZACHARY K. GOLDMAN, AFTER THE BREACH: CYBERSECURITY
LIABILITY RISK 1 (2014), https://www.lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/
CLS-After-the-Breach-Final.pdf.
18 Sissi Cao, Facebook Fined $660K for Cambridge Analytica, but Expert Says $7B More Is
Underway, OBSERVER (July 11, 2018), https://observer.com/2018/07/uk-regulators-fined-
facebook-660k-over-cambridge-analytica/.
19 Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014).
20 KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at 1.
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video records and a different law for cable records.”21  And even within a
particular sector, the federal law may not govern the entirety of data privacy
within that industry.  While the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-
bility Act (HIPAA) of 1996 is federal legislation protecting the privacy and
security of health information,22 “[n]ot all health data is covered by HIPAA,
and various constitutional and state laws can protect health data more strin-
gently than HIPAA.”23  The federal sectoral approach results in fragmenta-
tion that “leaves large areas unregulated . . . at the federal level.”24  Without
“a national law that prescribes specific data security standards for all indus-
tries,”25 data collection by companies like Facebook, Google, and Amazon
will remain ungoverned by federal law.26
B. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC has been the most prominent federal agency to enforce cyber-
security practices over the past two decades.  This Note will focus on the
growth, limitations, and criticisms of the FTC’s enforcement authority in the
cybersecurity area.  Because of the gaps that are left in the sectoral data pri-
vacy laws at the federal level, “many companies fall outside of specific sectoral
privacy laws.”27  The FTC has stepped in to enforce within those gaps.  The
FTC’s privacy jurisprudence “has become the broadest and most influential
regulating force on information privacy in the United States—more so than
nearly any privacy statute or common law tort.”28  Thus, “[t]he FTC is the
closest thing that the U.S. federal government has to a centralized data secur-
ity regulator.”29
1. History of the FTC
The FTC was created in 1914 “to prevent unfair methods of competition
in commerce as part of the battle to ‘bust the trusts.’”30  The FTC has the
21 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 587 (first citing Video Privacy Protection Act of
1988, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710–2711 (2012); and then citing Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.)).
22 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S. Code).
23 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 587.
24 Id.
25 KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at 1.
26 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 587.
27 Id. at 588.
28 Id. at 585–86.
29 KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at 2.  There are other agencies, such as the Department of
Health and Human Services or the Federal Communications Commission, that have some
jurisdiction to regulate data privacy and security, but they are limited to only particular
sectors. Id.
30 About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Feb.
25, 2019).
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power to enforce “three targeted laws that oblige certain types of businesses
to act reasonably in protecting consumer data.”31  However, for most of its
privacy-related work, the FTC relies on its general authority under section
5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA)32 to proscribe unfair
or deceptive acts or practices.33  This authority was given to the FTC when
Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendment in 1938, which included “a
broad prohibition against ‘unfair and deceptive acts or practices.’”34
“Despite the lack of a statute that sets minimum data security require-
ments, the Federal Trade Commission aggressively polices data security.”35
For the many companies that “fall outside of specific sectoral privacy laws, the
FTC is in many cases the primary source of regulation.”36  The FTC has used
FTCA section 5 to bring complaints against companies that violate their con-
sumers’ privacy rights or fail to meet the guarantees of their privacy
policies.37
In 1995, when “the FTC became involved with consumer privacy
issues[,] . . . [i]nstead of the FTC creating rules, the companies themselves
would create their own rules, and the FTC would enforce them. . . . The FTC
thus would serve as the backstop to the self-regulatory regime, providing it
with oversight and enforcement . . . .”38  To start, the FTC policed privacy
policies “by focusing on deceptive trade practices.”39  “Prior to 1964, the
[FTC] largely ignored the word ‘or’ in [FTCA section 5],” making little
“attempt to distinguish between ‘unfair’ . . . and ‘deceptive.’”40  However,
FTCA section 5 “gives the FTC two different tests for an organization’s data
31 Alden F. Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission’s Role in Online Security: Data Protector or
Dictator?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 10, 2014), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/
pdf/LM137.pdf [hereinafter Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission] (“The commission’s
Safeguards Rule, which it adopted pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, sets forth data
security requirements for non-bank financial institutions.  The Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) requires that consumer reporting agencies use reasonable precautions to ensure
that the entities to which they disclose sensitive consumer information have a permissible
scope for receiving that information and imposes safe disposal obligations on entities that
maintain consumer report information.  The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) requires reasonable security measures to safeguard children’s information col-
lected online.” (footnotes omitted)).
32 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012)).
33 Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission, supra note 31.
34 About the FTC, supra note 30; see also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 598.
35 KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at 1.
36 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 588.
37 See, e.g., id. at 628–30.
38 Id. at 598 (footnote omitted).
39 Id. at 599.
40 J. Howard Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION (May 30, 2003) (quoting Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49,
52 Stat. 111 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012)), https://www.ftc.gov/pub
lic-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection.
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privacy and cybersecurity practices.”41  The FTC uses the “deceptive” prong
under FTCA section 5 to bring data privacy enforcement actions “[i]f an
organization holds itself out as having implemented a certain data privacy
practice . . . [and] act[s] outside that data privacy practice.”42  Thus, “[w]hile
the United States doesn’t have strong privacy rules like the [General Data
Protection Regulation], the FTC has a rule that organizations must abide by
their own privacy policies, and it can take action against those that fail to do
so.”43
The FTC uses the “unfair” prong under FTCA section 5 “to bring actions
against entities with known data breaches,” under the logic that “[l]ax cyber-
security . . . is an unfair method of competition.”44  Today, the FTC applies a
three-part test, which is codified in FTCA section 5(n), to determine whether
a practice is “unfair”: “[T]o warrant a finding of unfairness, an injury ‘[1]
must be substantial; [2] it must not be outweighed by any countervailing ben-
efits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and [3] it must
be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have
avoided.’”45  Before FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,46 “the FTC focused pri-
marily on the deception prong of Section 5 to trip up companies that failed
to live up to statements they made about their data use and security
practices.”47
Instead of defining or listing which specific practices would constitute
unfairness, “Congress ‘intentionally left development of the term “unfair” to
the Commission’ through case-by-case litigation.”48  Additionally, “[t]he
Commission is authorized under 15 U.S.C. § 57a to prescribe rules ‘which
define with specificity’ unfair acts or practices within the meaning of Section
5(a).”49  Once a rule is defined, “it becomes in essence an addendum to Sec-
tion 5(a)’s phrase ‘unfair . . . acts or practices’ [and] the rule puts the public
on notice that a particular act or practice is unfair.”50  In the case-by-case
litigation context, “once an act or practice is adjudged to be unfair, the act or
41 John McCauley & Kyle Miller, LabMD and the Future of FTC Data Privacy Regulation,
BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL (July 17, 2018), https://www.bgdlegal.com/blog/labmd-and-
the-future-of-ftc-data.
42 Id.
43 Grant Gross, How Updated Privacy Policies Could Make GDPR the Global Standard, PAR-
ALLAX (May 25, 2018) (citation omitted), https://www.the-parallax.com/2018/05/25/ftc-
gdpr-privacy-standard/.
44 McCauley & Miller, supra note 41.
45 LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting FTC Policy State-
ment on Unfairness, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 17, 1980), https://www.ftc.gov/public-state
ments/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness (alterations in original)).
46 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
47 Allison Grande, Landmark FTC Win Fuels Uncertainty for Data Breach Targets, LAW360
(Apr. 8, 2014), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e153167e-28ca-4d31-89c7-
dcbfc9daa643/?context=1000516.
48 LabMD, 894 F.3d at 1228 (quoting Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367 (1965)).
49 Id. at 1231 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B) (2012)).
50 Id. (omission in original) (quoting Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a) (2012)).
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practice becomes in effect—like an FTC-promulgated rule—an addendum to
Section 5(a).”51  However, in the vast majority of enforcement actions that
the FTC brings against companies, “nearly all [FTC actions] end[ ] in settle-
ments rather than case law.”52
2. FTC Enforcement Actions and Development of a “Jurisprudence of
Privacy”
Since 2006, the FTC “has held businesses responsible for their privacy
and security promises to consumers under its power to investigate unfair and
deceptive trade practices granted in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.”53  “[T]he FTC has brought dozens of enforcement actions against
companies that it believes have failed to take reasonable steps to secure the
personal data of their customers.”54  FTCA section 5 is “a century-old law that
was designed to protect consumers and competitors from unfair business
practices.”55  If the FTC determines that a company is engaging in inade-
quate cybersecurity practices, the FTC will threaten to file a lawsuit under
FTCA section 5.56  Instead of proceeding to trial, most companies agree to a
consent order, which “generally require companies to develop comprehen-
sive information security programs, obtain periodic independent assessments
of their information security, and provide the FTC with broad oversight and
access into the company’s programs for up to twenty years.”57  Violating the
consent order “can result in significant fines,” but agreeing to a consent
order allows a company to avoid admission of guilt, the risks of publicity, and
the costs of litigation.58
The FTC has not consistently gone after repeat offenders, leading to a
“questionable track record of holding companies accountable for privacy vio-
lations.”59  Without holding repeat offenders accountable, the FTC under-
mines “the credibility of law enforcement and regulatory agencies . . . by the
real or perceived lax treatment of repeat offenders.”60  For example,
Facebook has been under a consent decree since 2011, but has since been
embroiled in the Cambridge Analytica scandal.61  The FTC announced in
March 2018 that it “takes very seriously recent press reports raising substan-
51 Id. at 1232.
52 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 588.
53 Burke & Millendorf, supra note 3, at 3.
54 KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at 1.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 5–6.
57 Id. at 6.
58 Id.
59 Gross, supra note 43.
60 Jesse Eisinger, New Commissioner Says FTC Should Get Tough on Companies Like Facebook
and Google, PROPUBLICA (May 14, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/rohit-chopra-
ftc-commissioner-ftc-should-get-tough-on-companies-like-facebook-and-google.
61 See Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, FTC Opens Investigation into Facebook After Cam-
bridge Analytica Scrapes Millions of Users’ Personal Information, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/03/20/ftc-opens-investiga
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tial concerns about the privacy practices of Facebook . . . [and] confirm[ed]
that it has an open non-public investigation into these practices.”62
FTC consent orders generally last twenty years; the timespan may make
the orders unnecessarily expensive and create unintended problems for com-
panies.63  First, twenty years of FTC oversight is a costly task—for an Agency
already short on time and resources, twenty years is far too long.  More signif-
icantly, if the past twenty years are any indication, “changes in technology,
consumer expectations, and the marketplace” will likely be substantial over a
twenty-year period.64  In 2017, Sears Holdings Management Corporation
(“Sears”) submitted a petition to the FTC “to reopen and modify the settle-
ment to which they agreed in 2009.”65  In its petition, Sears argued that the
2009 consent order required it to “handl[e] consumer notices in its mobile
applications in a way different from other companies’ industry-standard
mobile apps” in a way that did not align with consumer’s changing expecta-
tions.66  Sears additionally argued that compliance with the consent order
“imposed ‘heavy’ competitive burdens that ‘significantly disadvantaged Sears
in the marketplace.’”67  With the changing commercial landscape, “[m]any
companies will not be doing business in 20 years . . . [and] [e]ven large
Fortune 500 companies significantly change in a decade.”68  Additionally, the
prescriptive requirements in FTC consent orders “may . . . become obsolete,
given changes in the market” over the twenty-year life of the order.69  If the
FTC is unwilling to modify its 2009 consent order that actually “harm[s]
Sears’ ability to compete in the marketplace[,] . . . Sears will need to con-
tinue to comply with the arguably antiquated requirements for another 12
years.”70
3. Expansion of FTC Authority After Wyndham Worldwide
One of the first companies to “mount a serious challenge to the FTC’s
cybersecurity enforcement authority” was Wyndham Worldwide Corpora-
tion-into-facebook-after-cambridge-analytica-scrapes-millions-of-users-personal-information
/?utm_term=.cf4ca66ec032.
62 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement by the Acting Director of FTC’s
Bureau of Consumer Protection Regarding Reported Concerns About Facebook Privacy
Practices (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/03/state
ment-acting-director-ftcs-bureau-consumer-protection.
63 See KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at 5–6.
64 Wendell Bartnick, Sears Petitions to Change Its 8-Year-Old FTC Privacy Settlement Order,
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tion.71  Instead of agreeing to a consent order, as most companies do when
faced with the threat of a lawsuit by the FTC, “Wyndham moved to dismiss
the lawsuit, arguing . . . that Section 5 does not provide the FTC with the
authority to bring cybersecurity-related actions against companies.”72
In FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,73 the Third Circuit held that a com-
pany’s failure to maintain reasonable and appropriate data security could
constitute unfair commercial competition practices.74  Additionally, the
court noted that subsequent congressional acts did not preclude FTCA sec-
tion 5 from covering cybersecurity issues.75  The decision in Wyndham World-
wide was seen as a huge victory for the FTC, as the decision affirmed the
Agency’s “broadened . . . focus to encompass companies that it claims have
violated Section 5’s unfairness prong by failing to adequately protect con-
sumer data from unauthorized disclosure or misuse.”76  After Wyndham
Worldwide, the FTC has the authority to take action against bad security prac-
tices.  Despite the fact that “Congress has not passed a statute that provides
the FTC with general authority to regulate cybersecurity,”77 and even though
the court’s ruling in Wyndham Worldwide is only binding in the Third Circuit,
“it is largely accepted that the FTC has some authority to bring Section 5
complaints against companies that fail to adequately secure customer
data.”78
4. The Limits of the FTC’s Sanctioning Authority
Notably, the FTC’s ability to impose sanctions on companies is restricted
in scope and severity.  The FTC is only able to “enforce FTC Act violations or
infringements of other laws that granted it regulatory authority.”79  The FTC
“lack[s] the ability to enact substantive privacy rules of its own,”80 and if the
company does not fall within the scope of another privacy policy that pro-
vides the FTC authority, “then the FTC would have nothing to enforce.”81
Thus, the FTC’s sanctioning authority is “limited to . . . whatever a company
promised.”82  In 2012, “the FTC issued a $22.5 million dollar fine” against
Google, which was noted as “a small drop in the bucket” of Google’s $37.9
billion in revenue the previous year.83  As will be discussed in subsection
71 KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at 6.
72 Id.
73 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
74 Id. at 249.
75 Id. at 248.
76 Grande, supra note 47.
77 KOSSEFF, supra note 14, at 5–6.
78 Id. at 2.
79 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 599.
80 Id.  Congress, over the years, has given the FTC rulemaking and enforcement
authorities, but they are limited to specific privacy laws, such as COPPA. See id. at 602–03.
81 Id. at 599.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 605–06.
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I.C.2, while the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) may increase
compliance requirements for some companies, the FTC’s ability to enforce
the GDPR within the United States is limited to companies that (1) decide to
implement the GDPR within its operations, and (2) violate that privacy
promise.84
The severity of the FTC’s penalties is also quite limited.  “[I]n most
cases, the FTC cannot levy a fine against a company that violates its own pri-
vacy promises.”85  Once the FTC brings an enforcement action against a
company and that company agrees to a consent order—which generally
“requires the targeted company to create a comprehensive privacy or security
plan, and to submit to independent audits every other year for 20 years”—
only “[i]f the company . . . violates the agency enforcement plan[ ] [can] the
FTC . . . levy fines of more than $40,000 per violation.”86  However, “any fines
issued by the FTC must reflect the amount of consumer loss.”87  The average
cost per lost or stolen record, however, is estimated to be $148.88  When the
FTC does fine a company, the fines “are often quite small in relation to the
gravity of the violations and the overall net profit of the violators.”89
5. The FTC’s Body of “Law”
While the FTC may have some authority to take action against bad data
security practices as a result of Wyndham Worldwide, its use of “a patchwork of
consent decrees and informal statements is insufficient” if it wants to
“shape[ ] industry norms and legal standards—if it wants to develop a gen-
eral law of data security.”90  What is currently missing from the FTC’s
enforcement process are “decision[s] on the merits” and the development of
“legally binding rules through . . . rulemaking procedures.”91  In a footnote,
the Wyndham Worldwide court “agree[s] with Wyndham that the consent
orders, which admit no liability and which focus on prospective requirements
on the defendant, [are] of little use to [businesses] in trying to understand
the specific requirements imposed by [FTCA section 5(a)].”92  The Third
Circuit went on to recognize that it “may be unfair to expect private parties
. . . to have examined FTC complaints or consent decrees.”93  While the
Commission offered no examples of it “inform[ing] the public that it needs
84 See Gross, supra note 43.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 605.
88 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY, supra note 11, at 3.
89 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 605.
90 Gus Hurwitz, In Wyndham, the FTC Won a Battle but Perhaps Lost Its Data Security War,
AEIDEAS (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.aei.org/publication/wyndham-ftc-won-battle-per
haps-lost-data-security-war/.
91 Id.
92 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 257 n.22 (3d Cir. 2015).
93 Id. at 257 n.23.
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to look at complaints and consent decrees for guidance,” it still argued that a
“careful general counsel [would] pay attention to what the FTC is doing.”94
In some instances, the FTC has published recommendations “without
inquiring into whether such onerous new requirements would prove cost-
beneficial to producers or to consumers.”95  In 2014, the FTC recommended
a set of limitations in the data broker area to Congress, without first undergo-
ing “a serious empirical analysis of consumer harm in this area.”96  Commis-
sioner Joshua Wright spoke to the problematic nature of the FTC’s
recommendations, stating that the FTC cannot issue recommendations and
guidance without a thorough analysis of how the costs to businesses might
affect consumers.97  Without enough research and analysis, the FTC’s ques-
tionable recommendations may actually “reduce consumer welfare.”98
Additionally, the FTC’s enforcement of FTCA section 5 will be tied to
who sits on the Commission.  The FTC consists of five commissioners, “nomi-
nated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, each serving a seven-
year term.”99  Thus, acting without formal guidelines, the FTC’s enforcement
of FTCA section 5 “can be as broad or as narrow as a majority of the commis-
sioners at any given time believe it to be, and the business community suffers
from the resulting uncertainty.”100  Though Professors Daniel Solove and
Woodrow Hartzog argue that the “FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is quite
thick,” with standards resembling rules,101 former Commissioner Joshua
Wright recognized that the “common-law, case-by-case approach to defining
Section 5 . . . is undesirable because it leads to inconsistent and unpredict-
able results, and invites Congress and the courts to step in and define the
FTC’s authority.”102
The authority of the FTC may also be at the mercy of court decisions.  In
LabMD v. FTC, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the FTC for overreaching,
because its “order contain[ed] no prohibitions.”103  Instead of “instruct[ing]
LabMD to stop committing a specific act or practice . . . [the order] com-
mand[ed] LabMD to overhaul and replace its data-security program to meet
an indeterminable standard of reasonableness.”104  The mandate of “a com-
plete overhaul of LabMD’s data-security program” was held unenforceable
94 Id.
95 Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission, supra note 31, at 8.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 10.
99 Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners
(last visited Nov. 25, 2018).
100 BAKERHOSTETLER, THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE COMMISSION, THE JUDICIARY, AND CONGRESS (2015), https://
www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/Documents/News/Articles/LITIGATION/2015/Past-
Present-Future-Section%205-White-Paper.pdf.
101 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 586.
102 BAKERHOSTETLER, supra note 100.
103 LabMD, Inc., v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018).
104 Id.
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because the Commission said “precious little about how this [was] to be
accomplished[,] . . . effectually charg[ing] the district court with managing
the overhaul.”105  Based on this ruling, the FTC will likely “have to tailor the
conditions it imposes on companies it has accused of failing to safeguard
consumer data” by “set[ting] specific data security benchmarks for corporate
defendants.”106  This ruling and rebuke of the FTC for overreaching “means
confusion, nervousness, new challenges to the FTC’s authority and the need
to develop new and improved compliance orders.”107  If LabMD stands, “it
could affect the viability of some of the Commission’s remedial powers,”
including some of the already-existing consent orders that “include[ ] broad
prophylactic remedies that are similarly premised on a reasonableness
standard.”108
Thus, the “FTC’s self-styled ‘common-law’ approach to data security reg-
ulation is yielding an unsound body of law.”109  Despite over fifteen years of
FTC enforcement, there is no meaningful body of judicial decisions to show
for it.  Nearly all cases have resulted in settlement agreements.110  While con-
sent orders may be lengthy and inconvenient, “there is considerable evidence
that consent orders ‘lack teeth,’ permitting companies tremendous flexibility
to satisfy the terms of the consent order without improving privacy and secur-
ity practices internally.”111  Thus, companies live in a world where the FTC
has broad authority to take action against companies for their data security
practices, but its ability to issue clear guidance on what constitutes bad data
security practices is convoluted and unclear.
C. Global Pressures
1. European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation
In 2016, the European Union passed the General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR)112 as its “omnibus data protection law,” replacing the Euro-
105 Id. at 1237.
106 Alison Frankel, There’s a Big Problem for the FTC Lurking in 11th Circuit’s LabMD Data-
Security Ruling, REUTERS (June 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-labmd/
theres-a-big-problem-for-the-ftc-lurking-in-11th-circuits-labmd-data-security-ruling-idUSKC
N1J32S2.
107 Kirk Nahra, Takeaways from the 11th Circuit FTC v. LabMD Decision, IAPP (June 7,
2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/takeaways-from-the-11th-circuit-ftc-vs-labmd-decision/.
108 Rafael Reyneri, Eleventh Circuit LabMD Decision Potentially Limits FTC’s Remedial Pow-
ers, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIVACY (June 11, 2018), https://www.insideprivacy.com/united-
states/federal-trade-commission/eleventh-circuit-labmd-decision-potentially-limits-ftcs-re
medial-powers/.
109 Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV.
955, 955 (2016).
110 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 585.
111 Michelle De Mooy, How to Strengthen the FTC Privacy & Security Consent Decrees, CTR.
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://cdt.org/blog/how-to-strengthen-the-ftc-
privacy-security-consent-decrees/.
112 See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
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pean Union’s twenty-year-old Data Protection Directive.113  The Data
Protection Directive was issued in 1995, during a very different technology
era than today.114  Additionally, the Data Protection Directive “was limited
because it was just that—a directive.”115  The Data Protection Directive set a
minimum baseline that “EU member states had to meet in their own data
protection laws,” but each member state “could craft their own laws as they
saw fit.”116  Similar to the current state of cybersecurity law in the United
States, the Directive model “led to a patchwork of data protection laws across
Europe, with some countries implementing more stringent (and occasionally
more unique) laws than others.”117  By passing the GDPR, the European
Union “directly impose[d] a uniform data security law regime on all EU
members . . . thereby harmonizing EU data protection law.”118
The GDPR, comprised of ninety-nine articles over 261 pages, “set[s] out
the rights of individuals and obligations placed on businesses that are subject
to the regulation.”119  Notably, the GDPR provides data subjects with greater
control.120  The GDPR mandates that companies receive consumer consent,
defined as a “clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific,
informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the
processing of personal data.”121  The “[r]ight to data portability” allows data
subjects to request any personal data a company has on them and “transmit
[their] data to another controller without hindrance.”122  Additionally, data
subjects have the “[r]ight to erasure” or the “right to be forgotten,” and in
certain situations, “the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal
data without undue delay.”123  The GDPR also requires that companies
appoint and hire a data protection officer.124  Data protection officers are
tasked with “inform[ing] and advis[ing] the controller or the processor,”
“monitor[ing] compliance with [the GDPR],” “provid[ing] advice where
requested . . . and monitor[ing] its performance,” and “cooperat[ing] with
the supervisory authority.”125  Additionally, “any data that can be used to
113 Courtney M. Bowman, A Primer on the GDPR: What You Need to Know, PROSKAUER:







119 Andrew Rossow, The Birth of GDPR: What Is It and What You Need to Know, FORBES
(May 25, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewrossow/2018/05/25/the-birth-of-
gdpr-what-is-it-and-what-you-need-to-know/#1d18f7955e5b.
120 See GDPR, supra note 112, arts. 12–16, at 39–43 (describing the rights of the data
subject).
121 Id. at 6.
122 Id. art. 20, at 45.
123 Id. art. 17, at 43–44.
124 Rossow, supra note 119.
125 GDPR, supra note 112, art. 39, at 56.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-5\NDL513.txt unknown Seq: 14 25-JUN-19 15:30
2224 notre dame law review [vol. 94:5
identify an individual—be it genetic, psychological, cultural, religious and/or
socioeconomic—all now falls under the GDPR umbrella.”126
The GDPR affects European Union member states and applies not just
to European businesses, but additionally “to any entities that work with
[European] businesses as well, thus making GDPR a global data protection
law.”127  Companies who are within the scope of the GDPR and are noncom-
pliant with it may face astronomical penalties, with fines up to four percent of
total worldwide annual turnover or twenty million euros, whichever is
higher.128
2. FTC’s Enforcement of the GDPR
On top of attempting to understand and comply with the GDPR, the
FTC has also signaled that it plans to enforce statements of GDPR compli-
ance.  Three U.S. companies have already agreed to settle FTC charges that
they misled consumers about their participation in the European
Union–United States Privacy Shield framework.129  Since FTCA section 5
authorizes FTC actions for “deceptive practices,” its enforcement creates
incentives for companies to not make promises to be GDPR compliant.
Instead, “[a]s companies revamp their privacy policies to comply with the
GDPR, many have been careful to avoid making new promises.”130  This is an
example of the problematic incentive created by the FTC in how it enforces
companies’ privacy policies: companies will simply be careful to not over-
promise their security measures so as to escape scrutiny by the FTC.  This
disincentive is at odds with how we want companies to operate—we want to
encourage companies to increase their cybersecurity practices.
3. GDPR-Inspired Legislation in Brazil and India
Business executives believe that “the GDPR will likely inspire other coun-
tries to expand data privacy regulations.”131  Since the GDPR was adopted,
Brazil and India have followed suit with GDPR-inspired data laws.132  In July




128 See GDPR, supra note 118, art. 83, at 82–83.
129 See Katherine E. Armstrong, The FTC’s First Privacy Shield Enforcement Actions, LEX-
OLOGY (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7610e1ea-ca11-
497f-9ebb-2e1ee09b5d13.
130 Gross, supra note 43.
131 Ross Benes, Business Execs Believe More Countries Will Adopt GDPR-Like Laws,
EMARKETER (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.emarketer.com/content/business-execs-believe-
more-countries-will-adopt-gdpr-like-laws.
132 See Jessica Trevellick, New GDPR-Inspired Data Laws in Brazil and India, JDSUPRA
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-gdpr-inspired-data-laws-in-brazil
-95445/.
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2018, India published a first draft of its new Personal Data Protection Bill.133
In August 2018, Brazil’s President signed the “lei geral de proteção de dados
pessoais,” which will go into effect in February 2020.134  Notably, the rules
contained in both Brazil’s and India’s new data privacy legislation “will be
applicable not only to companies based in Brazil and India but also to busi-
nesses outside of those countries that are processing the personal data of
Brazilian and Indian citizens.”135  Just as the GDPR requirements extend to
non-EU organizations that deal with EU citizens, the Brazil and India
requirements will similarly extend to organizations that deal with the per-
sonal data of their citizens.  Thus, U.S. companies must also consider the
cybersecurity requirements of a growing number of other countries.
D. State Law and State Enforcement
An additional layer to federal sectoral data privacy laws is that “most state
privacy laws are sectoral as well,”136 which further complicates what compa-
nies must comply with, even for the same type of data.  However, most state
laws and the four privacy torts are largely ineffective at filling in the gaps of
federal laws.137  The four privacy torts—intrusion on seclusion, public disclo-
sure of private fact, false light, and misappropriation of image—have been
interpreted narrowly, “prevent[ing] their ability to redress data harms”
resulting from “contemporary privacy and security problems.”138
Any business calling the FTC the “de facto data protection authority”
would be doing so “at their peril.”139  Instead, companies must be aware of
the role state attorneys general serve, as they “also play a critical role . . .
investigat[ing] the impacts of security breaches that involve the personal
information of their states’ residents.”140  At the state level, state attorneys
general have played a large role in shaping and enforcing data privacy law.
“[E]mbrac[ing] their role as consumer watchdog,” state “attorneys general
have devoted significant time and energy to privacy and data security
enforcement”141 and have “pioneered baseline privacy norms” through litiga-
tion, persuasion, and legislation.142  State attorneys general “from across the
country investigated security breaches at retailers such as Target, Neiman




136 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 587.
137 See id.
138 Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 747, 798 (2016).
139 Divonne Smoyer & Aaron Lancaster, Think the FTC Is the De Facto U.S. Data Protection
Authority? State AGs May Have Something to Say, IAPP (Dec. 12, 2013), https://iapp.org/
news/a/think-the-ftc-is-the-de-facto-u-s-data-protection-authority-state-ags-may/.
140 Burke & Millendorf, supra note 3, at 9.
141 Citron, supra note 138, at 748, 753.
142 Id. at 758–85.
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J.P. Morgan Chase.”143  Where there are federal gaps in regulations, state
attorneys general “have established privacy norms . . . [and] pressed for
thicker consumer privacy protections than those sought by federal agen-
cies.”144  Many states also have unfair and deceptive trade acts and practices
(“UDAP”) statutes that give state attorneys general the authority “to seek civil
penalties, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs.”145  State UDAP stat-
utes “do not contain the same limitations on recovery of civil penalties as
does the FTC Act.”146  Thus, “rather than having one de facto [data protec-
tion authority] in the FTC, the U.S. actually has 50+ such [data protection
authorities].”147
To further add to this uneven and fragmented cybersecurity landscape,
the European Union’s adoption of the GDPR has spurred a number of states
to pass new or amended GDPR-inspired data privacy legislation.  These new
state data breach laws “expand the definition of personal information and
specifically mandate that certain information security requirements are
implemented.”148  In late June 2018, California signed into law the California
Consumer Privacy Act, which will go into effect in January 2020.149  “Califor-
nia’s new privacy law . . . allows consumers to learn what personal informa-
tion about them is held by businesses, and to opt out of the sale of that
information.”150  The wave of new state legislation shows the “increased state
interest in closely regulating the means by which personal data is stored and
protected—rather than simply imposing requirements and penalties for
breach events.”151  Iowa passed a law to take effect on July 1, 2018, which
“regulat[es] online services and mobile apps for students” by “prohibit[ing]
the use of students’ information for certain purposes, such as creating stu-
dent profiles or selling or renting a student’s information.”152  Iowa’s law
adds to the already-problematic sectoral framework, as it is specific to
internet operators who use student information.153  Additionally, “it requires
operators to implement and maintain security procedures and practices
appropriate and consistent with industry standards and applicable state and fed-
143 Burke & Millendorf, supra note 3, at 9.
144 Citron, supra note 138, at 785.
145 Id. at 750, 754.
146 Smoyer & Lancaster, supra note 139.
147 Id.
148 Jeewon Kim Serrato et al., US States Pass Data Protection Laws on the Heels of the GDPR,
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (July 9, 2018), https://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2018/
07/u-s-states-pass-data-protection-laws-on-the-heels-of-the-gdpr/.
149 See Assemb. B. 375, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
150 Wendy Davis, Advertisers Tell FTC California Privacy Law Threatens Web Economy, DIGI-
TAL NEWS DAILY (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/
323973/advertisers-tell-ftc-california-privacy-law-threat.html.
151 Sean Ahern, First Europe, Now the States: Big Changes Coming to State Data Privacy Laws,
JDSUPRA (June 27, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/first-europe-now-the-states-
big-changes-36098/.
152 Serrato et al., supra note 148.
153 Id.
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eral laws, rules, and regulations.”154  But as Part I has demonstrated and as Part
II will discuss, compliance consistent with this patchwork of cybersecurity law
is unmanageable.
Powerful states may also exert a regulatory effect on other states, aptly
labeled the “California effect.”155  Companies are incentivized “to follow the
regulatory standards of powerful states” because “stronger state standards are
more likely to be adopted . . . and enjoy wide support from policy groups.”156
With California’s recent data privacy legislation, companies who deal with the
personal data of California residents will be forced “to decide whether to
overhaul all their data collecting operations or build in-certain operations
solely for their California clients.”157
While new proposed and enacted state legislation “mirror some of the
protections provided by Europe’s newly enacted General Data Protection
Regulation,”158 the data privacy acts thus far are significantly narrower than
the omnibus of the GDPR.  The increasing number of state bills “represents
ongoing efforts at the state level to augment and strengthen protections for
consumer data privacy—by adding additional requirements on businesses
that deal with protected personal data.”159
II. CHALLENGES TO COMPLIANCE
Part I discussed how companies face cybersecurity compliance obliga-
tions from all directions in the form of a hodgepodge of state, federal, and
international statutes; regulatory guidance; and various enforcement actors.
The sheer number of obligations companies have within the cybersecurity
landscape make it unmanageable and costly for companies to comply.  This
Part discusses how the current state of cybersecurity compliance is insuffi-
cient to achieve the goal of true security of consumers’ data.
A. One-Time Check-the-Box Compliance
Many of the companies who have suffered high-profile data breaches
over the past few years were actually labeled compliant at the time of the
breach.160  Target was a victim of “what was called an ‘epic’ security breach,”
but “was validated as [payment card industry]-compliant just two months
154 Id. (emphasis added).
155 Citron, supra note 138, at 762 (citing DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP 247–70 (1995)).
156 Id.
157 Rhys Dipshan, Corporate Compliance Efforts in the Dark with California Privacy Law,
LEGALTECH NEWS (July 11, 2018), https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/2018/07/11/cor-
porate-compliance-efforts-in-the-dark-with-california-privacy-law/.
158 Serrato et al., supra note 148; see also GDPR, supra note 112.
159 Ahern, supra note 151.
160 Christian Moldes, Compliant but Not Secure: Why PCI-Certified Companies Are Being
Breached, J. CYBER SECURITY & INFO. SYS., May 2018, at 18, 18 (“The number of security
breaches in the past two years has increased considerably, even among the companies for
which assessors deemed compliant.”).
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before the breach.”161  In other words, the company was ostensibly comply-
ing with the payment card industry data security standard (PCI DSS) when
the breach occurred.162  However, “[o]ne of the major misconceptions about
PCI DSS compliance is PCI DSS-certified companies are secure or hacker-
proof.”163  Additionally, “only 29 percent of companies are compliant a year
after validation,” as they often are simply “checking the boxes for PCI DSS
compliance off their list . . . and then forgetting about it until the next audit
is due.”164  Yet, “compliant” designations were given to Target just “weeks
before hackers installed malware on the retailer’s network,” or for six consec-
utive years before Heartland Payment Systems suffered a major data
breach.165  Verizon’s 2015 PCI compliance report found that not a single
company who suffered a breach was fully PCI DSS compliant at the time of
the breach.166  However, meeting compliance standards for the purpose of
an audit does not mean that “security controls [are] sustainable or resilient
after the initial certification assessment.”167  “Data security programs that
employ a ‘check-the-box’ approach will likely be viewed as ineffective.”168
Many organizations dangerously “assume that . . . compliance is merely pass-
ing their annual assessments and obtaining certifications.”169  The problem
with this, however, is treating compliance as a “singular event,” as opposed to
making compliance a “part of the organization’s continuous monitoring
effort.”170  Security experts even recommend that companies “must build
and manage an advanced security program that goes far beyond specific sets
of compliance requirements” to keep their data completely protected from
criminals.171
Additionally, existing “legal rules . . . establish[ ] a floor” and “play[ ]
only a limited role in animating corporate processes and practices more
broadly.”172  Numerous Chief Privacy Officers (“CPOs”) have noted “the lim-
ited role that specific legal rules play[ ] in directly shaping their actual under-
161 Kurt Hagerman, Security vs. Compliance, ARMOR BLOG (Feb. 16, 2016), https://
www.armor.com/blog/security-vs-compliance/.
162 The PCI DSS “is a set of security standards designed to ensure that ALL companies
that accept, process, store or transmit credit card information maintain a secure environ-
ment.” PCI FAQs, COMPLIANCEGUIDE.ORG, https://www.pcicomplianceguide.org/faq/#1
(last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
163 Moldes, supra note 160, at 20.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. (“Of all the companies investigated by our forensics team over the last 10 years
following a breach, not one was found to have been fully PCI DSS compliant at the time of
the breach.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting VERIZON, PCI COMPLIANCE
REPORT 12 (2015)).
167 Id.
168 Davis et al., supra note 8, at 650.
169 Moldes, supra note 160, at 20.
170 Id.
171 Hagerman, supra note 161.
172 Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the
Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 265 (2011).
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standing of privacy’s meaning,” while one CPO in particular pointed out that
the statutes merely “enforce the minimum.”173  Thus, it is evident that the
compliance standards set forth—in content and in practice—are simply
insufficient for companies to achieve actual data security.
B. Unmanageable and Unclear Compliance Demands
Businesses’ “[l]itigation concerns are compounded by the piecemeal
condition of state and federal laws governing cybersecurity obligations.
[This] includes fragmented statutes and regulations, and evolving common
law standards that pose an obstacle to formulating stable expectations about
cybersecurity behavior.”174  Businesses face “a patchwork of sometimes con-
tradictory state . . . laws” and increasingly aggressive government enforce-
ment.175  What is clear is that the current state of cybersecurity law “does not
provide clear guidance to companies that are looking to effectively manage
not only cyber incidents themselves, but also attendant liabilities.”176
While “[t]he specter of fifty state attorneys general pursuing a company
for privacy or data security violations is more theoretical than real,” a “pile-up
effect” concern is still relevant.177  Companies may face overlapping state and
federal actions with duplicative costs.  Even if the FTC brings an enforcement
action against a company, “[c]ompanies must also watch out for parallel liti-
gation by state attorneys general.”178
The GDPR has ninety-nine articles spanning 261 pages.179  For many
businesses, especially small businesses, attempting to fully understand the
GDPR’s requirements on their own may be impossible.  Thus, a business may
have to hire outside experts to help ensure compliance within its organiza-
tion.  Even though the increasingly stringent data privacy standard of the
GDPR is now in effect for all companies that do business with residents of the
173 Id. at 266.
174 GERMANO & GOLDMAN, supra note 17, at 2.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Citron, supra note 138, at 796–97.
178 Kevin LaCroix, Cybersecurity Enforcement: The FTC Is Out There, THE D&O DIARY (Apr.
21, 2015), https://www.dandodiary.com/2015/04/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-cyber-
security-enforcement-the-ftc-is-out-there/ (“Snapchat’s case is illustrative. . . . In May 2014,
the FTC filed a complaint against Snapchat, alleging that the company made false repre-
sentations about the disappearance of the snaps, the collection of users’ personal data, and
the robustness of its data security.  Based on these allegations, the FTC asserted that
Snapchat had engaged in deceptive practices under section 5 of the FTC Act.  In May 2014,
Snapchat agreed to settle with the FTC.  The consent order prohibited misrepresentations
about the company’s data privacy and security, required Snapchat to establish a compre-
hensive privacy program, and imposed independent monitoring and reporting obligations
for 20 years.  While the FTC enforcement action was pending, the Maryland attorney gen-
eral advanced similar allegations against Snapchat and claimed violations of Maryland con-
sumer protection law and COPPA.  Snapchat agreed to pay $100,000 and take corrective
measures in a June 2014 settlement with Maryland.”(footnote omitted)).
179 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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European Union, it is still unclear what the exact scope of the laws are.  A
major criticism of the GDPR is that it “leaves much to interpretation.” 180
The GDPR requires companies to take “reasonable steps” and “reasonable
measures” but never defines what “reasonable” means.181  Similarly, with
respect to the California Consumer Privacy Act, it is unclear whether the law
applies only to consumer personal data, or employee personal data as well.182
Thus, “most companies will face a hard time complying with the law’s data
request, consent and deletions mandates.”183  In addition, the Act includes
restrictions on financial incentive practices that are “unjust, unreasonable,
coercive, or usurious in nature.”184  Exactly what “unjust, unreasonable, coer-
cive, or usurious in nature” means is unclear unless “definitive regulatory
guidance” is issued.185
As discussed in Section I.B, the compliance expectations provided by the
FTC are wholly inadequate.  Instead of “issu[ing] any formal regulations or
rules related to data security under Section 5 . . . the FTC argues that it ‘has
been investigating, testifying about, and providing public guidance on com-
panies’ data-security obligations under the FTC Act for more than a dec-
ade.’”186 Wyndham Worldwide was seen as a “hugely frustrating decision for
breach victims,” particularly because it validated the FTC’s “efforts to punish
companies for failing to take ‘reasonable’ steps to secure sensitive data with-
out giving any guidance about what ‘reasonable’ is.”187  Critics of the FTC’s
authority have found it troubling “that the FTC apparently expects businesses
to divine from a large number of ad hoc, fact-specific consent decrees with
varying provisions what they must do vis-à-vis data security to avoid possible
FTC targeting.”188  Companies are expected to rely on “complicated consent
decrees for guidance (in the absence of formal agency guidelines or litigated
court decisions),” which increases the costs of compliance.189
180 Michael Nadeau, General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): What You Need to Know to




182 See Dipshan, supra note 157.
183 Id.
184 See Assemb. B. 375, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
185 Dipshan, supra note 157.
186 Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Essay, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data
Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 694 (2013)
(quoting Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Wyndham Hotels and Resorts’ Motion to
Dismiss at 13, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 12-1365, 2013 WL 1222491 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 25, 2013) (No. 2:12-cv-01365), 2012 WL 4766957).
187 Grande, supra note 47 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jason Wein-
stein, partner at Steptoe & Johnson LLP).
188 Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission, supra note 31, at 5.
189 Id.
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Even if the FTC finds that a company violated its consent decree, “the
process by which it came to that conclusion likely won’t be made public.”190
The FTC operates in secrecy, “mak[ing] it difficult to know how its enforce-
ment methods may have failed to prevent [companies] from repeatedly
engaging in deceptive privacy practices.”191  This lack of clarity and trans-
parency makes it more difficult for companies to know how to manage their
privacy practices moving forward, “highlight[ing] the need for a national pri-
vacy law.”192
III. A CALL FOR FEDERAL OMNIBUS REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The adoption of the GDPR is itself a huge addition of obligations for
companies to the already-messy, piecemeal framework of cybersecurity law.
The amount of GDPR-inspired legislation at the state and global levels is only
making compliance with cybersecurity law more unmanageable and difficult.
Without federal legislation, it will be increasingly tougher for companies to
understand how to comply with these regulations; how to best protect them-
selves from liability; and, most importantly, how to protect consumers’ data
privacy.  Thus, policymakers should consider creating preemptive federal
cybersecurity to replace the current fragmented and unworkable approach.
“[P]rospects for federal regulation of cybersecurity and consumer pri-
vacy were dim” even during the Obama administration, and “meaningful fed-
eral legislation and regulation are nonstarters” within the Trump
administration.193  However, from the hack of Sony, “allegedly orchestrated
and sponsored by North Korea,”194 to the Russian hacking of the 2016 U.S.
elections,195 it is clear that data security has become a “national security
issue.”196  Despite the challenges in securing federal regulation of cyber-
security and data privacy, this Note repeats the call for a federal omnibus
regulation, a national answer to a national security issue.  While there are
substantial limits and issues with the FTC’s enforcement of data privacy, regu-
lation from a de facto enforcement agency “appears significantly preferable
to relying on burgeoning state regulation.”197
This Note does not argue for a simple copy and paste of the GDPR.
Rather, this Note argues for a federal law that carefully considers how to most
effectively incentivize true security within businesses.
190 Louise Matsakis, The FTC Is Officially Investigating Facebook’s Data Practices, WIRED
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/ftc-facebook-data-privacy-investigation/.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Jonathan Mayer, Data Protection Federalism: Opportunities for State Executive Leadership
on Cybersecurity and Consumer Privacy, CENTURY FOUND. (Aug. 15, 2018), https://tcf.org/
content/report/data-protection-federalism/?agreed=1.
194 Davis et al., supra note 8, at 624.
195 Twelve Russians Charged with US 2016 Election Hack, BBC (July 13, 2018), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44825345.
196 Davis et al., supra note 8, at 624.
197 Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission, supra note 31, at 9.
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A. Benefits of Federalism Do Not Apply in Cybersecurity
Critics may argue that data security and privacy are areas of law that
ought to be left to the states.  However, the nature of the internet and elec-
tronic commerce is not one that is defined by state borders.  Electronic com-
merce and associated data breaches have an “inherently interstate nature.”198
The moment a “developer’s app is offered in the iTunes store, consumers in
all fifty states can download it,”199 potentially placing that developer immedi-
ately within the scope of every state’s cybersecurity and data privacy laws.
One of the biggest benefits of federalism—and one of the biggest criti-
cisms of a federal omnibus privacy law—is that it allows for state experimen-
tation.  Critics argue that “[t]he preemptive scope of an omnibus federal
privacy law [would be] likely to block new approaches to information pri-
vacy.”200  Additionally, states are more often the “first to act in response to
new problems or issues, of which many arise in a time of rapid technological
and cultural change.”201  While innovation is important, and it is true that
innovation and experimentation occur more effectively at the state level, that
very experimentation has, in effect, undermined security compliance.  Partic-
ularly in light of the GDPR, the passage of GDPR-inspired state legislation,
and the increasing presence of various state and federal enforcement agen-
cies, it is becoming more difficult for companies to know what to comply with
and how to comply effectively.  And because of the reality that the “ever-
evolving nature of technology creates a moving target for agency enforce-
ment,”202 it may even be more important that there is a single, centralized
enforcement authority, as opposed to fifty dynamic experiments occurring at
once, with the expectation that businesses comply.
Additionally, leaving cybersecurity and data privacy laws to the states may
allow the most restrictive state policy to dictate.203  Currently, the FTC is
arguably the largest federal enforcement authority in cybersecurity and data
privacy.  However, its model, as discussed in Section I.B, is highly problematic
and limited, despite its growing position as the de facto data protection
authority.204  FTC enforcement initiatives “are supplemented by an increas-
198 Id.
199 Citron, supra note 138, at 802.
200 Paul M. Schwartz, Essay, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 930 (2009).
201 Id.
202 Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 186, at 695.
203 See Citron, supra note 138, at 762 (“Companies have a strong incentive to follow the
regulatory standards of powerful states.  David Vogel has labeled this phenomenon the
‘California effect.’ . . . In recognition of this phenomenon, Attorney General [Kamala]
Harris has said: ‘If we can strengthen privacy protections here [in California], we can bene-
fit consumers around the world.” (third alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quot-
ing Jessica Guynn, Facebook to Require Privacy Policies for All Apps in App Center, L.A. TIMES
(June 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/22/business/la-fi-facebook-ag-2012
0622)).
204 Cf. Smoyer & Lancaster, supra note 139 (noting impact that state attorneys general
can have on U.S. data protection).
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ing number of state government actions bearing on data security.”205  The
cybersecurity landscape, as it stands, is overly difficult to comprehend, which
makes it far too costly and unmanageable to comply with.  Thus, a central-
ized and streamlined set of regulations will help further the goal of achieving
actual security.
B. Market Failure Requires Increased Federal Involvement
Despite the alarming increase in data breach headlines, “[c]onsumers
. . . do not seem to change their buying behavior at those breached
merchants,”206 and “are seemingly less worried about privacy and online
security.”207  While a company’s “cash flow, cash reserves, [and] capital struc-
ture” are affected after a breach, it does not occur “at the hands of consum-
ers.”208  A 2016 study found that “[c]onsumers are quick to return to
breached merchants,” “return[ing] . . . nearly three months after the
breach.”209  The study found that some consumers returned due to a lack of
awareness of the breach or were “unfazed . . . in a way that materially
change[d] their shopping behavior.”210  Consumer apathy toward data secur-
ity is growing, to the point where consumers may actually be “simply
accepting a certain level of risk when they participate in the digital
economy.”211
While “highly publicized breaches provide one form of incentive,” even
in high-profile cases like Target, who “paid $39 million to settle a class action
lawsuit resulting from the cybersecurity breach of its customers’ personal
information,”212 a Deloitte study reported that “56 percent of respondents
said they still plan[ned] to shop . . . at retailers that have experienced a data
breach.”213  Consumers reported they continue to shop at breached stores
for a variety of reasons: the store offers the best prices,214 they “do not feel
205 Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission, supra note 31, at 9.
206 BRANDEN R. WILLIAMS, CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD BREACHES: HOW CONSUMERS
REACT TO RETAIL BREACHES 3 (2016), https://www.brandenwilliams.com/brwpubs/Con-
sumer%20Attitudes%20Toward%20Breaches_FINAL.pdf.
207 Laura Paine, In the Age of Apathy, Enterprises and Consumers Must Improve Online Secur-
ity Together, SECURITY.COM (Aug. 23, 2018), https://blog.security.com/security-apathy-
enterprises-consumers-must-improve-security/.
208 WILLIAMS, supra note 206, at 3.
209 Id. at 9.
210 Id.
211 Paine, supra note 207 (“There is a distinct sense and awareness that consumers are
losing control of their data, and there is a feeling that little can be done about it.”).
212 John J. Chung, Critical Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Market Failure, 96 OR. L. REV.
441, 468 (2018).
213 Renee Morad, Target Makes a Comeback One Year After Security Breach, SYMANTEC,
https://www.lifelock.com/learn-data-breaches-target-makes-comeback-almost-year-security-
breach.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2019).
214 See id.
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enough harm, or simply do not care enough . . . to change their spending
behavior.”215
Even though cybersecurity is regarded as “a matter of national security
and defense” and “a public good that benefits all,” private entities are relied
upon “to provide the public good even though there is little economic incen-
tive to do so.”216  Within the current landscape, companies are not suffi-
ciently incentivized to bolster their cybersecurity defense.  Cybersecurity
funding by private entities continues to be underfunded, even though “[t]he
frequency, complexity, and costs associated with attacks are increasing.”217
Part of the underfunding is because organizations “are unable to accurately
quantify the financial value of prospective investments” in cybersecurity
defense.218  The full cost of a cyberattack is not felt by the breached organiza-
tion, but “borne by numerous unrelated third parties”; thus, “the amount of
investment in cybersecurity will not incorporate the full, actual cost of poten-
tial harm.”219  If an entity could accurately measure and make the optimal—
or even adequate—investment in cybersecurity, the entity “will not be able to
charge for the positive externalities it generates.”220
The costs of achieving true security in compliance with the unevenly
layered, changing, and inconsistent patchwork of cybersecurity law are astro-
nomically high.  Self-protection does provide an incentive to invest in cyber-
security defenses,221 and while the immediate cost of handling a security
breach may be high, due to consumers’ general lack of awareness of
breaches, preference for convenience, and apathy toward data security,
“[t]he market, by itself, is unable to provide sufficient incentives for an opti-
mal amount of spending on cybersecurity.”222  Thus, the need for a compre-
hensive preemptive federal cybersecurity law is stronger than ever.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS IN CREATING FEDERAL OMNIBUS LEGISLATION
A. Incentivizing Holistic Security
Whether it’s the creation of federal legislation or the FTC more defini-
tively promulgating rules, rulemakers should consider what will most effec-
tively lead to true cybersecurity.  Federal policymakers may consider adopting
a policy that better incentivizes holistic security, as opposed to incentivizing
companies to do the bare minimum to escape liability when a breach occurs.
Legislation should consider what motivates companies and how companies
will navigate such legislation or regulations.  One big problem “that surfaces
again and again, regardless of [the] regulatory standard[,] . . . [is] failing to
215 WILLIAMS, supra note 206, at 12.
216 Chung, supra note 212, at 457.
217 Id. at 470–71.
218 Id. at 471.
219 Id. at 458.
220 Id.
221 See id. at 457.
222 Id. at 470.
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understand the difference between compliance and security.”223  However,
“compliance does not equal security—it’s merely a snapshot of how your
security program meets a specific set of security requirements at a given
moment in time.”224  Organizations often conflate the two and “get so con-
sumed by complicated regulations that they stop focusing on security alto-
gether.”225  However, when companies are faced with the threat of liability
accompanied by heavy sanctions, they focus on the complicated regulations
instead of focusing on what security measures make sense.  This is worsened
when the regulations are not sufficient to achieve actual security.
One way to consider better incentivizing security is by offering compa-
nies an affirmative defense to a certain level of liability after a breach occurs.
Ohio recently signed into law the Data Protection Act, “which provides busi-
nesses with an affirmative defense to data breach claims if the business was in
compliance with reasonable security measures at the time of the breach.”226
Thus, Ohio offers a safe harbor defense, providing an innovative way to
incentivize cybersecurity compliance.  Instead of seeking to “motivate
through threat of punitive measures, Ohio’s [Data Protection Act] offers a
fresh and affirmative step forward”227 and seeks “to be an incentive and to
encourage businesses to achieve a higher level of cybersecurity through vol-
untary action.”228  The Act “will be the first in the nation [that] incentivizes
businesses to implement certain cybersecurity controls by providing them
with an affirmative defense.”229  Affirmative defenses, however, may just
incentivize companies to do the bare minimum to successfully assert the
affirmative defense to escape liability.230  Thus, offering a safe harbor or
223 Hagerman, supra note 161 (“The most common misconception?  Thinking compli-
ance and security are one and same.”).
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Dena Castricone, Compliance with Established Cybersecurity Standards Provides Protection
from Liability in Ohio, JDSUPRA (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/compli
ance-with-established-15509/.
227 Jeffrey T. Cox, New Ohio Data Protection Law Incentivizes Business Community to Institu-
tionalize Cybersecurity, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=7b0bb9fa-ed91-4fd6-b56e-65909690d362.
228 John Landolfi & Chris Ingram, New Ohio Law Incentivizes Businesses that Comply with
Cybersecurity Programs, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Sept. 20, 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting S.B. 220, 132 Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/
columbus/news/2018/09/20/new-ohio-law-incentivizes-businesses-that-comply.html).
229 Id.
230 For example, the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense available to employers in Title
VII sexual harassment lawsuits is easily satisfied if an employer can show that (1) it took
reasonable steps to prevent and correct sexual harassment in the workplace, and (2) the
employee failed to take advantage of the employer’s preventive or corrective measures. See
Joseph A. Seiner, Plausibility Beyond the Complaint, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 987, 1018–21
(2012).  Thus, employers have been incentivized to create antiharassment policies and
make reasonable efforts to disseminate those policies.  However, in the wake of the
#MeToo movement, those “reasonable” efforts, while protecting employers from liability,
evidently did little to effect change in workplace culture. See Lauren Stiller Rikleen,
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affirmative defense to businesses may be effective for incentivizing cyber-
security compliance, but should be structured in a way that sets the bar high,
such that the minimum baseline offers some effective level of data security.
Various affirmative defenses could be used in conditioning disclosure
requirements on a business’s level of security, similar to how the GDPR fash-
ions its disclosure requirements.
Some have questioned whether “imposing massive liability on a company
that falls victim to a data breach [is] truly the best way to protect consumer
data.”231  This criticism is called even more into question when companies
are required to fully understand and comply with a “patchwork quilt of state
data breach laws [which] presents a compliance quagmire for businesses.”232
Companies may want to avoid fines, but if the fines are too small they may be
regarded as a cost of doing business.  Additionally, if the ceiling for fines is
too high and the actual threat of fines too uncertain, the threat of sanction-
ing high penalties may not be very effective.233  For the Cambridge Analytica
breach, Facebook’s penalty—$40,000 per violation multiplied by over eighty-
seven million users affected—“could theoretically add up to trillions of dol-
lars.”234  Despite this, there is doubt that the FTC would ever fine such an
amount.235  For sanctions to be effective, “a certainty threshold . . . has to be
met,” which “requires successful prosecution and sanctioning.”236  However,
oftentimes “enforcement authorities fail to collect the fines they issue[ ],”
which further reduces the efficacy of sanction threats.237
B. Leverage Reputational Harm
While reputational harm currently has limited import,238 it could be bet-
ter leveraged to play a role in incentivizing companies to implement mea-
sures that help protect against hackers and data breaches.  In addition to the
costs of data privacy litigation and potential penalties, companies’ reputa-
tions still suffer, causing them to lose out on potential revenue.  Fifty-four
percent of over 7000 public companies “had an incident in the past two and
half years that materially impacted their reputation,” which led to “a loss of
Faragher-Ellerth at 20: How Far Have We Come? And Where Do We Need to Go?, A.B.A.: LAB. &
EMP. L., Spring 2018, at 1, 1.
231 Grossman, supra note 9, at 1283.
232 Cox, supra note 227.
233 See Benjamin van Rooij & Adam Fine, How to Punish a Corporation: Insights from Social
and Behavioral Science, COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Sept. 1, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/
compliance_enforcement/2017/09/01/how-to-punish-a-corporation-insights-from-social-
and-behavioral-science/.
234 Cao, supra note 18.
235 Id.
236 Rooij & Fine, supra note 233.
237 Id. (“Fine collection rates have been well below 50% across different enforcement
agencies, with the DOJ only collecting 4% of penalties imposed.”).
238 See supra Section III.B.
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trust.”239  According to a KPMG study, nineteen percent of consumers com-
pletely stopped shopping at a retailer after a breach, and thirty-three percent
took a break from shopping at that retailer for an extended period.240  While
another study found that “[o]nly 4% [of consumers] took their business to a
competitor that they perceived to be more secure, with an additional 2%
indicating they did not return specifically because of the breach,” it is at least
clear that companies suffer from “the digital equivalent of a natural disaster
. . . [which] causes a minor interruption in operations with a significant capi-
tal outlay to clean up and return to normal operations.”241
However, the risk of reputational harm may not affect all companies
equally.  Reputational costs are higher for “companies in industries such as
banking, utilities, and travel and transportation,” and trust may play a bigger
role when “consumers tie their values to products they purchase and the
companies they work for.”242  The reputation incentive may be limited by
how much press is devoted to a company’s data breach, and the amount of
press devoted to a particular data breach may be determined by how large a
company is, how badly the company got it wrong, or how many total users
were affected.  When “the general public rarely pays attention to FTC privacy
actions,” the reputational harm may only occur if the privacy action is ampli-
fied on social media or on the news.243  Within the privacy sphere, reputa-
tional damage may be more limited as it is “largely within the community of
privacy professionals and the entities that do business with a particular
company.”244
One way to better leverage reputational harm incentives may be to
implement a National Cybersecurity Index, similar to Transparency Interna-
tional’s Corruption Perceptions Index.245  On the Corruption Perceptions
Index, countries are scored on a “scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very
clean).”246  In addition to each country’s score in rank order, the Corruption
Perceptions Index includes the previous four years for comparison.  In the
cybersecurity context, companies could be rated on a scale of zero (highly
susceptible to data breaches) to 100 (highly secure).  Just as “[n]o country
gets close to a perfect score in the Corruption Perceptions Index,” it may be
likely that there is no company that gets close to a perfect security score.247
However, companies may be motivated by an external score to be the most
239 Mengqi Sun, What Loss of Trust Costs Companies in Dollars and Cents, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
31, 2018), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2018/10/31/what-loss-of-trust-costs-
companies-in-dollars-and-cents/?mod=relatedInsights.
240 Green & Hanbury, supra note 5.
241 WILLIAMS, supra note 206, at 11–12.
242 Sun, supra note 239.
243 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 606.
244 Id.
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highly secure company within its industry or to improve its score year after
year.  Additionally, a Cybersecurity Index could serve as a central database for
all data breaches, so consumers can confirm the security history of a com-
pany before deciding to start or continue using a company’s product or ser-
vice.  Additionally, a centralized database may help combat consumers’
general lack of awareness of data breaches.248
Of course, the risk of creating a Cybersecurity Index or ratings system is
that if a highly rated company experiences a breach, trust diminishes in the
Index, and it may lose its value.  Countries at the bottom of the Corruption
Perceptions Index, because of their endemic corruption, may not care that
they fall at the bottom of the Index, but a low Cybersecurity Index score is
essentially a broadly advertised statement of distrust, and as discussed above,
loss of trust can have a substantial impact on a company’s “profitability,
growth and sustainability.”249
C. Consider a Different Standard for Small Businesses
Policymakers should also consider the impact of compliance regulations
and standards on small businesses.  The costs of compliance, as well as the
cost of a data breach, are significantly worse for small businesses.  All of these
complex compliance issues are magnified for small businesses, who may not
have the personnel or resources to understand regulations, implement pro-
grams, or ensure security.  At the same time, “[t]he National Cyber Security
Alliance claims that one in five small businesses gets hacked every year,”
reflecting the increased risk posed for small businesses.250  Many smaller
businesses may be “tempt[ed] to ignore [security vulnerabilities] because of a
lack of personnel or sizable resources to dedicate to cybersecurity.  However,
this is precisely what makes these businesses a prime target.”251  And once a
small business gets hacked, “sixty percent go bankrupt within six months.”252
“[T]he average cost of a single data breach [for small- and medium-sized
enterprises] can be as much as $117,000.” 253  An alternative standard, how-
ever, should not be based solely on the size of the company, but perhaps on
the type of information collected or the amount of data collected.  A small
company handling the most sensitive privacy information should not be sub-
jected to a laxer standard simply because it is a smaller company.  However,
even a heightened security standard for smaller companies that is stream-
lined may make it more feasible for smaller companies to comply.
248 See supra Section III.B.
249 Sun, supra note 239.
250 Noah G. Susskind, Note, Cybersecurity Compliance and Risk Management Strategies: What
Directors, Officers, and Managers Need to Know, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 573, 578–79 (2015)
(“[S]mall businesses often fail to realize what lucrative targets they are.”).
251 T.J. DeGroat, Security Audits and Penetration Testing, SPRINGBOARD BLOG (July 10,
2018), https://www.springboard.com/blog/security-audits-and-penetration-testing/.
252 Susskind, supra note 250, at 578.
253 DeGroat, supra note 251.
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D. Increase Regularity of Security Audits and Penetration Tests
As discussed in Section II.A, companies that are deemed compliant have
suffered high-profile data breaches over the past several years.  These organi-
zations tend to only appear compliant on the day of the security audit, and it
is only the snapshot of the company’s compliance program at that particular
moment in time that looks secure.  Organizations would benefit from greater
visibility and control of all data locations, greater security awareness by all of
the organization’s stakeholders, and regular self-assessments.254  Ensuring
continuous monitoring could be achieved through establishing a federal
agency or an independent agency255 that would regularly and randomly per-
form security audits and penetration tests.  A security audit is “a systematic
evaluation of . . . enterprise IT infrastructure defenses,” which can evaluate a
company’s past and future risks.256  Data breach response plans are often
ineffective because they are not reviewed often enough or in a timely man-
ner.257  In a 2014 study, thirty-seven percent of companies “[had] not
reviewed or updated [its data breach response plan] since it was put in
place.”258  Forty-one percent of companies had “[n]o set time period for
reviewing and updating the plan.”259  Fourteen percent reviewed and
updated their plans “[o]nce each year,” five percent reviewed and updated
their plans “[t]wice per year,” and only three percent reviewed and updated
their plans “[e]ach quarter.”260  However, security audits are insufficient
alone, as they are merely snapshots at a given point in time.  Penetration
tests, however, “go beyond security audits . . . by trying to breach [a com-
pany’s] system just like a hacker.  In this scenario, a security expert will try to
replicate the same methods employed by bad actors to determine if [a com-
pany’s] IT infrastructure could withstand a similar attack.”261
V. CRITIQUES
Solove and Hartzog are proponents of the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence
serving as a functional equivalent body of common law.262  They argue that
through the FTC’s settlement agreements with companies, the FTC has actu-
ally created a “robust privacy regulatory regime,”263 and that despite criticism
of the FTC, “the FTC has not been arbitrary and unpredictable in its enforce-
254 See GERMANO & GOLDMAN, supra note 17, at 6; Moldes, supra note 160, at 20.
255 An independent security auditing agency could be set up similar to how indepen-
dent accounting firms serve public companies.
256 DeGroat, supra note 251.
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ment.”264  However, their argument that the FTC’s settlement agreements
have created a body of common law “does not adequately address the ques-
tions of whether the FTC is appropriately applying its Section 5 authority in
finding unfairness and deception and whether it is imposing undue burdens
on business by failing to provide any guidance beyond that found in fact-
bound case-specific decrees.”265
Additionally, the expectation that companies should look to the FTC’s
settlement agreements as a body of law to adhere to is problematic, as a
major motivator to settling and agreeing to a consent order is to avoid the
costs of going to trial.266  Even Solove and Hartzog concede that a reason
that many of these cases hardly ever make it to court “might be that it is too
costly.”267  As there is “no threat of financial penalties for violating Section 5
. . . there is little financial incentive to spend a great deal of time and
resources fighting FTC complaints.”268  A recent example is “LabMD, . . .
[which] went out of business in the course of litigating against the commis-
sion.”269  Additionally, companies may be “reluctant to challenge administra-
tion complaints . . . [because] in administrative adjudication, a ‘reviewing
court must also accord substantial deference to Commission interpretation of
the FTC Act and other applicable federal laws,’”270 which would “make[ ] a
challenger’s victory less likely and risks the creation of an adverse prece-
dent.”271  Additionally, even if it were conceded that the FTC’s “common law
jurisprudence” was clear and developed, there still remains a massive patch-
work of state and federal laws that companies must comply with.  And with
the GDPR in effect, many companies must also figure out how to comply with
international law.
There is also concern that “[d]ata-security enforcement standards can-
not be so rigid as to stifle business growth or give hackers time to exploit the
rules.”272  By increasing federal regulation, we run “the risk that federal over-
regulation will undermine innovation, harm businesses, and weaken the
264 Id. at 608.
265 Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission, supra note 31, at 4 n.19.
266 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 611–13 (“Settling with the FTC . . . allows for
companies to ‘eliminate the uncertainty and expense of lengthy negotiation and pretrial
preparation and litigation.’” (quoting 1 STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
§ 12:4 (2013))).
267 Id. at 611.
268 Id.
269 Frankel, supra note 106.
270 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 613 (quoting A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://
www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (last revised July 2008)).
271 Id.
272 Gordon, supra note 15, at 204 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Amanda R. Moncada, Comment, When a Data Breach Comes A-Knockin’, the FTC Comes A-
Blockin’: Extending the FTC’s Authority to Cover Data-Security Breaches, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 911,
941 (2015)).
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economy.”273  However, these concerns must be weighed against what is cur-
rently happening: companies are unable to sift through the patchwork of
cybersecurity regulations and struggle to comply, making them likelier
targets for hackers.  For small companies, the risk of maintaining noncomp-
liant practices means being subject to significant financial liability from a
wide range of government actors.  The risk of getting breached means poten-
tially going bankrupt.
CONCLUSION
The current state of cybersecurity law is unclear and unmanageable, and
given the increasing frequency of high-profile data breaches, it remains an
urgent priority to national security.  This Note makes a call for an omnibus
federal privacy law that would carry a preemptive effect over of state cyber-
security and data privacy laws.  The benefits of federalism are outweighed by
the increasingly evident costs for companies attempting to secure themselves
from not just hackers, but also liability.  Data security has become a national
security issue urgently requiring a national solution.  This omnibus federal
privacy law should consider avoiding minimum baseline standards and incen-
tivize businesses to adopt holistic and continuous security.
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